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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE LA~W-OLD AGE ASSISTANCI--VOLUNTARY ASSISTANCE BY
RELATIVES AS BASIS FOR DisQUALIFICATION-[Missouri]:.-In two separate
appeals from decisions of the State Social Security Commission denying
applications for old age assistance under the Missouri statute, which author-
izes the commission to grant assistance to any person who "has not suffi-
cient income or resources to provide a reasonable subsistence compatible
with decency and health,"' the facts showed that both applicants met re-
quirements as to age and residence and incapacity to earn a living. A
monthly donation of fifty dollars was received from a son-in-law by the
wife of one applicant; the other was living with and supported solely by
contributions of an adult daughter. Held, that inasmuch as there is no
legal duty on children to support ,parents, such donations are "gifts"; con-
sequently, applicants were without resources, income, or means of support,
and were eligible for assistance. Commission reversed.2
At common law there was no obligation to support indigent aged rela-
tives;3 but, as early as 1601, recognizing that relatives are morally bound,
Parliament established the legal duty for those sufficiently able. 4 In pre-
scribing eligibility under present state plans for old age assistance, most
states expressly provide that aid from persons able to assist or legally
responsible for assistance shall be considered in determining the need which
is the basis for granting assistance.5 Even in the absence of statutory duty,
it has been held, as to an applicant receiving aid from relatives, that the
source and amount of support are controlling factors in determining need.0
As a rule, the conclusion of an administrative officer or body will not
be judicially disturbed unless plainly wrong.7 Whether the commission exer-
1. Mo. Laws of 1935, sec. 12, p. 308, as amended, Mo. Laws of 1937, see.
a, p. 467, Mo. Stats. Ann. (1938 Supp.) sec. 12967b-12.
2. Moore v. State Social Security Commission (Mo. App. 1938) 122 S. W.
(2d) 391; Price v. State Social Security Commission (Mo. App. 1938) 121
S. W. (2d) 298.
3. Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. Powers (1937) 192 Wash. 475, 74
P. (2d) 27; Schouler, Domestic Relations (1895) 422.
4. (1601) 43 Eliz. c. 2, sec. 7, commented on in 25 Halsbury, Laws of
England (1937) 407, sec. 710; Betz v. Horr (1937) 250 App. Div. 457, 294
N. Y. S. 546, 548, where it was stated that the object of statutes to this
effect is to prevent the public from loss occasioned by neglect of a moral
duty and to translate that duty into a statutory and legal liability.
5. Social Security Board, Sixteen Characteristics of State Plans for Old
Age Assistance (1937).
6. Soper v. Wheeler (1921) 239 Mass. 327, 132 N. E. 46 (relief denied).
7. Peterson v. Rodgers (Ariz. 1938) 78 P. (2d) 480; In re Gilhuly (1938)
124 Conn. 271, 199 Atl. 436; Adams v. Nagle (1938) 303 U. S. 532; Red
Canyon Sheep Co. v. Ickes (D. C. App. 1938) 98 F. (2d) 308, 322, where
it was held that mandamus will not issue to interfere with discretion of an
administrative officer in construing a statute even though the court would
construe the statute otherwise, providing the officer's construction is rea-
sonably possible; United States ex rel. White v. Coe (D. C. App. 1938) 95
F. (2d) 347.
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cised its discretion reasonably in the instant cases involves an inquiry as
to the legislative intent in regard to whether aid from relatives should be
considered as "income" or "resources." s Under the federal grants to states,
though the definition of those entitled to assistance is left to states,9 there
is available evidence of a congressional intent that grants should be avail-
able only to persons not receiving aid from relatives.'9 The Missouri legis-
lature directed the State Commission to "comply with the provisions of
any Act of Congress providing for the distribution and expenditure of
funds of the United States appropriated by Congress for social security
benefits, and to comply with any and all rules and regulations attached to
or made a part of such Appropriation Act * * * .",11 As absence of "means"
of support furnishes the basis upon which eligibility rests, it has been urged
that the benefits which any person receives "shall be determined with due
regard * * * to the conditions existing in each case * * * ."12 It would
appear on this analysis that the commission's conclusion that this aid should
be considered as "resources" was not unreasonable.
The provision that "Any applicant aggrieved by the action of the State
Commission in the denial of benefits * * * may appeal to the circuit court
* * * ," and that "Such appeal shall be tried de novo on the sole question
of whether the applicant is entitled to benefits and not as to the amount
thereof * * * "13 raises the question whether there is a delegation of execu-
tive power to the judicial branch.14 Upon a trial de novo, the court is not
limited to mere review of an administrative determination, but may inde-
pendently determine issues of fact and substitute its own judgment and
8. Black, Construction and Interpretation of Laws (2d ed. 1911) 46;
Sedgwick, Statutory and Constitutional Law (1874) 193; Sutherland, Statu-
tory Construction (1891) 309, sec. 234.
9. Social Security Act (1935) 49 Stat. 620, (1938 Supp.) 42 U. S. C. A.
sec. 301 et seq.
10. Conant v. State (Wash. 1938) 84 P. (2d) 378, 382. Robinson, J.,
dissenting, cites the following: In a hearing before the Committee on Ways
and Means (1935) H. R. Rep. No. 4120, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. at p. 83,
Dr. Witte is thus quoted: "This bill does not contemplate that where chil-
dren are able to support their parents they should not do so." In a report
of the Senate Finance Committee, of which Senator Harrison was chairman,
recommending passage of the Social Security Act, he stated: "We think
that children who are able to do so should continue to support their aged
parents, and the legislation which we are proposing is framed with this
in mind." (1935) Sen. Rep. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 4.
11. Mo. Laws of 1935, sec. 11, p. 308, as amended, Mo. Laws of 1937,
sec. a, p. 467, Mo. Stats. Ann. (1938 Supp.) sec. 12967b-11. See State Social
Security Commission of Missouri Manual (1938) 21: "Every effort should
be made to induce all relatives to recognize the moral responsibility and
assume the burden of support as long as it does not cause undue sacrifice
in their own families."
12. Wyatt and Wandell, Social Security Act in Operation (1937) 278.
13. Mo. Laws of 1935, sec. 16, p. 308, as amended, Mo. Laws of 1937,
sec. a, p. 467, Mo. Stats. Ann. (1938 Supp.) sec. 12967b-16.
14. Mo. Const. art. 3; Borreson v. Dep't of Public Welfare (1938) 368 Ill.
425, 14 N. E. (2d) 485; In re Northwestern Indiana Telephone Co. (1930)
201 Ind. 667, 171 N. E. 65; In re Opinion of Justices (1931) 85 N. H. 562,
154 AtI. 217.
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discretion for that of the administrative body.15 In Illinois a section of the
Old Age Assistance Act permitting an unsuccessful applicant to petition
the circuit court for a trial de -novo has been held an unconstitutional dele-
gation of power in view of the broad discretion intended to be granted to
the administrative agency.16
Since the instant decisions were handed down, the Missouri statute has
been amended to provide that benefits shall not be payable to any person
who has " * * * income, or resources, whether such income or resources is
received from some other person or persons, gifts or otherwise, sufficient
to meet his needs for a reasonable subsistance compatible with decency and
health."'17 Further, the appeal to the circuit court shall not involve a trial
de novo; instead, on an applicant's appeal, the proceedings before the com-
mission shall be certified, and upon this record the "circuit court shall
determine whether or not a fair hearing has been granted the individual.
If the court shall decide for any reason that a fair hearing and determina-
tion of the applicant's eligibility and rights under this act was not granted
the individual by the State Commission, or that its decision was arbitrary
and unreasonable, the court shall, in such event, remand the proceedings for
redetermination of the issues by the State Commission."' 8
As old age assistance grants are available not as a matter of right 0 but
to cope with the existing emergency,20 it is submitted that the better view
is that relatives able to do so should aid the indigent aged, and to this end
the legislature should have expressly provided that, where old age assistance
is granted, it shall appear that the applicant has no responsible relative or
other person able to furnish support.
P. H. A.
ARCHITECTS-PROTECTION OF PLANS AS INTELLECTUAL PwOPmrTY-Loss or]
RIGHT BY PUBLCATION-[Missuri].-Plaintiff, an architect, was employed
by defendants to prepare plans for modernization of a residence. The re-
modeled residence was open to the public for inspection, and the plan itself
was printed in a professional periodical. Later defendants constructed two
more residences from the same plans without plaintiff's consent. In a suit
for damages for the alleged unauthorized appropriation and use of plain-
tiff's plans, held, that plaintiff's common law copyright was extinguished by
publication.,
By common law authors are protected in the exclusive use of their in-
15. See Borreson v. Dep't of Public Welfare (1938) 368 Ill. 425, 432, 14
N. E. (2d) 485, 488.
16. Ibid.
17. (1939) Sen. Bill No. 32, 60th Gen. Ass.
18. (1939) Sen. Bill No. 31, 60th Gen. Ass.
19. See Robinson, J., dissenting, in Conant v. State (Wash. 1938) 84 P.
(2d) 378, 382.
20. State ex rel. Shomaker v. Super. Ct. (1938) 193 Wash. 465, 475, 76.
P. (2d) 306, 310.
1. Kurfiss v. Cowherd (Mo. 1938) 121 S. W. (2d) 282.
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